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IN THE SUPREME COURT THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, ) 
) . 41 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) CANYON COUNTY 
v. ) 
) 
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, ) APPELLANT'S BRI 
) IN SUPPORT OF 
Defendant-Appellant. ) PETITION FOR REVI 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
IDAHO 
CR 1 
Matthew 0. Brooks asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of the 
Idaho Court of Appeals, 2014 Opinion No. 77 (Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2014) (hereinafter, 
Opinion). He submits that this Court should exercise its review authority in this case 
because the Opinion is inconsistent with precedent from this Court and prior decisions 
of the Court of Appeals. Specifically, the Opinion does not, as required by this Court in 
Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 893 (2011 ), give 
the word "and" in Idaho Code § 49-808(2) its "plain, usual, and ordinary meaning." 
1 
GOU of probation on 
court further ings. 
Trooper Blake Higley of the Idaho State Police testified that, while he was on 
duty in his patrol vehicle on Interstate 84 in Canyon County, he saw a blue car driving 
approximately sixty miles hour in a seventy-five mile per hour zone, and then 
approximately fifty-five miles per hour in a sixty-five mile per hour zone. (Tr., Aug. ·16, 
201 p.5, 1 p.9, L.20 p.10, L.22, p.1 Ls.6-12.) Driving fifty-five miles an hour 
is eighty feet per . (R., p.85 & n.1; see Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.19, Ls.1-6.) 
The officer subsequently observed the driver of the car "make a lane change, 
activate his signal approximately less than two seconds, and move over in the slow 
lane." (Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.13, Ls.18-20.) According to Trooper Higley, "The vehicle 
department and Idaho Code requires a vehicle making a lane change, left or right, 
entering an on ramp from the interstate requires them to signal for not less than five 
continuous seconds." (Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.13, Ls.13-17.) He was referring to 
1.C. § 49-808(2}. (Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.13, Ls.21-23.) 
Trooper Higley then initiated a traffic stop and pulled over the blue car. (See 
Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.13, L.9- p.14, L.18.) He approached on the passenger side of the 
vehicle, helped the driver, Mr. Brooks, push down the window, and looked inside the 
car. (Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.15, Ls.3-9, p.19, L.23 - p.20, L.10.) The lane change was 
the only reason Trooper Higley pulled over the blue car, and the officer told Mr. Brooks 
2 
him over 
'16, p.14, 1 18, 
When Trooper Higley looked inside the he immediately saw on the 
passenger an open cigarette box with couple of in it. More 
importantly than that there was a small plastic bag which contained a clear crystal 
substance." (Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.15, Ls.1-16; see Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.24, Ls.6-12.) 
The officer believed that the crystal substance inside the plastic was methamphetamine. 
(Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.16, Ls.13-17.) He then seized the cigarette box and arrested 
Mr. Brooks. (Tr., Aug. 16, 201 p.17, Ls.13-18; see R., p.8; Tr., Aug. 1 2012, p.38, 
Ls.1 
The filed a Criminal Complaint alleging that Mr. committed the 
crime of possession of a controlled substance, felony, in violation Idaho Code § 
2732(c)(1 ). (R., pp.9-10.) After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate found probable 
cause and bound Mr. Brooks over to the district court. (R., pp.14-15.) The State 
subsequently filed an Information charging Mr. Brooks with the above offense. 
(R., pp.16-17.) He entered a plea of not guilty. (R., p.19.) 
Mr. Brooks then filed a Motion to Suppress, requesting an order suppressing all 
evidence obtained by the State as a result of an unlawful search and seizure of 
Mr. Brooks and his vehicle. (R., pp.21-25.) He also filed a Memorandum of Law in 
Support of the Motion to Suppress, requesting that the district court suppress the 
evidence based upon legal precedents including the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. (R., pp.26-32.) The 
State subsequently filed an Objection to Motion to Suppress Evidence. (R., pp.34-39.) 
3 
At on the I. § 
when 
is both on a controlled-access highway and turning from a position. 1 
(Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.40, Ls.2-10.) In any other instance, the statute only required a 
signal for not than 100 feet before turning. (Tr., Aug 16, 2012, p.41, Ls.2-3.) 
Thus, Mr. Brooks asserted that he should never have been pulled over, the resulting 
search was illegal, and all the evidence that was gathered in his case should be 
suppressed. (Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.43, Ls.10-15.) 
The district court, because it felt that the issue of the interpretation of l.C. § 49-
had not necessarily been in the briefing, the parties to submit 
further briefing on the language of§ 49-808(2) and whether it had violated under 
the facts of this case. (Tr., Aug. 16, 201 p.44, Ls.17-21, p.45, Ls.1 ) Both parties 
then filed supplemental briefing. (R., pp.44-58, 64-71, 74-81; see R., p.84.) 
The district court subsequently issued a Memorandum Decision upon Motion to 
Suppress, denying the motion to suppress. (R., pp.84-91.) The district court stated 
that, if the stop were valid, the warrantless search of the car and seizure of evidence 
would be justified under the plain view doctrine. (See R., pp.85-86.) At issue was 
whether "the stop [was] valid so that the officer was properly in a position to observe a 
particular area." (R., p.86.) 
The district court then stated that 'Trooper Higley was operating on the belief that 
drivers on Interstate Highway 84 are required to use a turn signal for five (5) seconds 
1 Mr. Brooks agreed that Interstate 84 was a "controlled access highway" for purposes 
of the statute. (Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.39, L.22 - p.40, L.1.) 
4 
this 
(citing 
v. locolucci, Canyon County CR 1 CR 201 1 
"That is, l.C. § 49-808(2) requires that on controlled-access highways the signal shall 
given continuously for not less than five (5) " (R., p.88.) The district court 
noted that Mr. Brooks stipulated that he was driving on a controlled-access highway. 
(R., p.88.) 
The district court also determined that "if Trooper Higley's belief that [Mr. Brooks] 
was required to use his turn signal for five (5) seconds turns out to be incorrect, his 
would most likely be characterized mistake of " (R., p.89.) 
Idaho precedent had not established whether a mistake of law was unreasonable per 
or whether a court should instead use the standard for mistakes of fact and ask if 
the mistake of law was objectively reasonable, the district court decided to use the 
reasonableness standard. (R., p.89.) According to the district court, "Trooper Higley 
had a good faith belief that [Mr. Brooks] was required to use his turn signal for five (5) 
seconds and considering the application of this statute by this Court and [another district 
court], his conduct was that of a reasonable person acting under the facts known at the 
time." (R., p.89.) 
Additionally, the district court did not "find any legal precedent to support 
[Mr. Brooks'] assertion that the statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face." 
(R., p.89.) Further, Mr. Brooks' "argument that a person of ordinary intelligence cannot 
understand the plain meaning of the statute is unpersuasive." (R., p.90.) Thus, the 
district court denied the motion to suppress. (R., p.90.) 
5 
1 an 
Reconsider. 11 In the the district stated that Court 
the plain of l.C. § 49-808(2) to require that drivers on controlled access 
highways must use their turn signal continuously for five (5) seconds before moving 
right or left." (R., p.117.) "Because this Court finds that l.C. § 49-808(2) required 
[Mr. Brooks] to use his turn signal for five (5) seconds, the stop and subsequent search 
(under the plain view exception as stipulated to by the parties) were reasonable and 
Trooper Higley was acting lawfully." (R., p.118.) 
The court then , "While this Memorandum did 
discuss a hypothetical scenario in which Trooper H had made a Trooper 
Higley was not mistaken." (R., p.119.) According to the district cou the officer 
correctly interpreted the law, and only if an appellate court determined otherwise would 
the discussion of mistake of fact or mistake of law apply. (R., p.119.) The district court 
stated that "this discussion is merely dictum." (R., p.119.) 
Mr. Brooks later entered into a plea agreement with the State, whereby he would 
plead guilty to possession of a controlled substance in this case and the State would 
dismiss the consolidated misdemeanor charges in a separate case, Canyon County No. 
CR 2012-12215*C. (R., pp.137-41; see R., pp.142-48.) So long as Mr. Brooks had no 
prior felony offenses, the State would recommend probation. (R., p.137.) Mr. Brooks' 
2 Mr. Brooks also filed a Motion for Permission to Appeal, requesting permission to 
appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. (R., pp.102-04.) After the 
district court denied the motion to reconsider, it issued an Order Denying Motion for 
Permission to Appeal. (R., pp.121- 23.) 
6 
would the to 
1 r. 
R., p.·1 
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended that Mr. Brooks be placed on 
probation, with an underlying unified of four with one year fixed. 
(R., pp.152-54.) Mr. Brooks recommended a withheld judgment with three years of 
probation. (R., p.153.) The district court granted a withheld judgment and placed 
Mr. Brooks on probation for a period of three years. (R., pp.153, 160-63.) 
Mr. Brooks then filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.164-67.) Mr. Brooks 
in his that the district court when it denied his motion suppress, 
the traffic was in violation of his federal and Idaho constitutional right to be 
from unreasonable searches and seizures. (App. Br., pp.3-4, 9-10.) The stop was 
not justified at its inception because, while the officer initiating the stop believed that 
Mr. Brooks had violated l.C. § 49-808(2), under the plain language of § 49-808(2), 
Mr. Brooks did not violate that statute. (App. Br., p.9.) The officer initiating the stop 
offered no other rationale for the stop. (App. Br., p.9.) Alternatively, Mr. Brooks 
asserted that if l.C. § 49-808(2) is ambiguous, it should be interpreted in favor of 
Mr. Brooks under the rule of lenity. (App. Br., p.9.) Further, Mr. Brooks asserted that 
the officer's misapprehension of § 49-808(2) was a mistake of law that rendered the 
stop per se unreasonable. (App. Br., p.9.) 
The Idaho Court of Appeals held in the Opinion that the district court did not err 
when it denied Mr. Brooks' motion to suppress, because "the plain, obvious, and 
rational meaning of the language of l.C. § 49-808(2) requires that a vehicle signal for at 
7 
( 1) on 
from a 
is parked)." (Opinion, Opinion, Mr. did 
not signal for at least five seconds before moving from the left lane to the right lane on a 
controlled-access highway, his violation of the provided reasonable suspicion for 
the stop. (Opinion, p.7.) 
Mr. Brooks filed a timely Petition for Rehearing, which the Idaho Court of Appeals 
denied. (See Order Denying Petition for Rehearing, Nov. 24, 2014.) He then filed a 
timely Petition for Review. 
8 
Is the Idaho of 
"r"~"' Court and the Court 
9 
Idaho 
Supreme 
A. 
Idaho Appellate Rules provide that the decision of whether to grant a 
for review is discretionary on the part of the Idaho Supreme Court, and that petitions for 
review may be granted only "when there are special and important reasons" for doing 
so. l.A.R. 118(b ). This of discretion is not completely unfettered. Rule 118(b) 
provides a non-exhaustive list of five factors which must 
( 1) 
for review: 
Whether the Court of Appeals has decided a 
not yet decided by the Idaho Supreme Court; 
considered in evaluating 
of SU 
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with 
precedent from the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States 
Supreme Court; 
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own 
prior decisions; 
(4) Whether the Court of Appeals' actions are so unusual as to call for 
the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority; and, 
(5) Whether a majority of the Court of Appeals has certified that further 
appellate review is desirable. 
I.AR. 118(b). In this case, Mr. Brooks contends that there are special and important 
reasons for review to be granted. Specifically, the Opinion is inconsistent with 
precedent from the Idaho Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals' prior decisions. 
In the Opinion, the Idaho Court of Appeals determined that "the plain, obvious, 
and rational meaning of the language of l.C. § 49-808(2) requires that a vehicle signal 
10 
(1) on 
on 
vehicle is parked)." (Opinion, p.7.) "[T]he word 'and' in I § signifies 
there are two circumstances and that a vehicle must signal continuously for at least 
five seconds when either or both circumstances apply." (Opinion, 
However, this Court has held that interpreting a statute "must begin with the 
literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary 
meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole." Verska v. Saint Alphonsus 
Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
interpreting in § 49-808(2) as signifying a disjunctive choice either or 
both of two circumstances, the Opinion does not give "and" its plain, usual, and ordinary 
conjunctive meaning. Put othenNise, the Opinion essentially revises the statute so that 
"and" means "or." Thus, the Opinion is inconsistent with Verska and other precedent 
from the Idaho Supreme Court, and is also inconsistent with prior decisions of the Court 
of Appeals. 
B. Standard Of Review And Applicable Law 
This Court has outlined the standard of review for a motion to suppress as 
follows: "When reviewing a motion to suppress, the standard of review is bifurcated. 
This Court defers to the trial court's findings of fact unless the findings are clearly 
erroneous. This Court freely reviews the trial court's application of constitutional 
principles to the facts as found." State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86 (2009). 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, over which appellate courts 
exercise free review. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829 (2001 ). 
11 
United and I, § 1 
unreasona 
officials. U . IV; 
Idaho Const Art. I, § ·17. "A traffic stop is subject to the Fourth Amendment restraint 
unreasonable searches and " State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983 
(Ct. App. 2003). A routine traffic stop, typically of limited scope and duration, is 
analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), because it is 
more analogous to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest. Id. "Under Terry, 
an investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts 
which justify suspicion that the detained is, has , or is about to engaged 
in criminal activity." Id. Under this standard, the "totality of the circumstances then 
known to the officer ... must show a particularized and objective basis for suspecting 
the particular person stopped of criminal activity." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
'To meet the constitutional standard of reasonableness, an investigative 
detention must not only be justified by reasonable suspicion at its inception, but also 
must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the 
first place." Id. A traffic violation, as an unlawful activity, in itself justifies a traffic stop. 
State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998). 
C. The Opinion Is Inconsistent With Precedent From The Idaho Supreme Court And 
The Court Of Appeals' Prior Decisions, Because It Did Not Give The Word "And" 
In l.C. § 49-808(2) Its Plain, Ordinary, And Usual Conjunctive Meaning 
Mr. Brooks asserts that the Opinion is inconsistent with precedent from the Idaho 
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals' prior decisions, because it does not give the 
word "and" in l.C. § 49-808(2) its plain, ordinary, and usual conjunctive meaning. Under 
12 
relevant portion 
continuously for not 
than 
l.C. § 49-808(2). 
of § 
§ 49-808(2) provides: 
turn or move right or left 
warn other traffic. On 
a parked 
than five (5) 
last one hundred ('100) 
This Court recently outlined the following rules of statutory interpretation: "The 
of a statute begin with the literal words of the those 
must their , usual, and ord meaning; and statute must 
construed as a whole." 151 Idaho (internal quotation marks omitted). "If 
the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law 
as written."3 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "We have consistently held that 
where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic 
evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent 
of the legislature." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "The asserted purpose for 
enacting the legislation cannot modify its plain meaning." Id. at 892-93 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Appellate courts do not have authority to revise or void "an 
unambiguous statute on the ground that it is patently absurd or would produce absurd 
results when construed as written." Id. at 896. "If the statute as written is socially or 
3 
"A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable 
construction. An unambiguous statute would have only one reasonable interpretation." 
Verska, 151 Idaho at 896 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
13 
it is judicial" 
). 
The Opinion determines that "the word in I. § 49-808(2) that 
there are two circumstances and that a vehicle must signal continuously for at least five 
when or both circumstances apply" (Opinion, p.6), and thus does not 
give the word "and" its plain, usual, and ordinary conjunctive meaning. Until the 
Opinion, this Court and the Court of Appeals consistently interpreted the "and" in 
sense. e.g., Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Pocatello-Chubbuck Auditorium 
or 
connecting or 
word is nction 
or 
'" (quoting Black's Dictionary . 1 In re Brink, 117 
(1 'and', as in 'probable cause to stop , is plainly 
conjunctive. It together the words 1 
Idaho 827, 830 (Ct. App. 2010) {"The conjunctive 'and' in this of I § 1 
2601 suggests that the suspension of a sentence must always be accompanied 
by probation."). 
Although courts must give the literal words of a statute "their plain, usual, and 
ordinary meaning," Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, the Opinion does not employ this rule or 
otherwise mention Verska. (See Opinion, pp.1-8.) Instead, the Opinion ostensibly 
gives the language of § 49-808(2) its "plain, obvious, and rational meaning." (See 
Opinion, p.4 (citing State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659 (1999).) However, the 
standard from Verska applies, not the one from Burnight. 
14 
more Idaho 
conflict between the two opinions. 
and 
v. Goodlett, 1 Idaho 
over 
any 
App. 
2003) (holding that, in event of a conflict between opinions, the more recent 
opinion controls with respect to any conflict between them). The Burnight standard is in 
conflict with Verska because its use of "rational" implies that a court may a 
statute to avoid irrational or absurd results. also Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-96 ("A 
literal reading of the is not necessarily irrational or absurd." (quoting State, Dep't 
of Law Enforcement v. 1955 Willys Jeep, 100 Idaho 150, 151 (1979)). this 
Court in Verska rejected "the contention that we could revise an unambiguous statute 
because we believed it was absurd or would produce absurd results .... " Verska, 
151 Idaho at 896. Thus, Verska controls with respect to this conflict See Goodlett, 139 
Idaho at 265. 
By determining that "the word 'and' in l.C. § 49-808(2) signifies that there are two 
circumstances and that a vehicle must signal continuously for at least five seconds 
when either or both circumstances apply" (Opinion, p.6 (emphasis added)), the Opinion 
does not give the word "and" its plain, usual, and ordinary conjunctive meaning as 
required by Verska. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 893. Rather, the meaning attributed to 
"and" by the Opinion is disjunctive-the Opinion essentially revises the statute so that 
"and" means "or." See, e.g., Filer Mut. Tel. Co. v. Idaho Tax Comm'n, 76 Idaho 256, 
261 (1955) ("[T]he use of the word 'or' in Section 63-105(15), l.C., is as a disjunctive 
that marks an alternative generally corresponding to 'either. (emphasis added); 
15 
1 ·1 
cou 
117 Idaho 
10 
perform this 
re no incision by judicial 
Thus, the Opinion's interpretation 
In 
inconsistent 
as well as the precedent from the Idaho Supreme Court and the prior decisions 
Appeals interpreting word "and." 
Opinion the use of in§ the 
in 1 
in 
that kinds )l) (Opinion, K 
, 111 Idaho 721).) However, to the that interpretation of in 
Mart Corp. conflicts with this Court's later rule from Verska that words must be given 
"their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning," see Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, Verska would 
control as the more recent opinion. See Goodlett, 139 Idaho at 265. Thus, K Mart 
Corp. does not justify the Opinion's departure from the plain, usual, and ordinary 
conjunctive meaning of the word "and" in § 49-808(2). 
The Opinion also determines that the plain, usual, and ordinary conjunctive 
meaning of "and" advocated by Mr. Brooks "would render the 'and' in the statute 
superfluous." (Opinion, p.6.) "If the legislature had intended Brooks's proposed 
interpretation, it could have eliminated the 'and' entirely and simply written that, 'before 
turning from a parked position on a controlled-access highway, the signal shall be given 
16 
is 
the of the statute if so that none void, 
superfluous, or redundant." Verska, 151 Idaho at 897 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Mr. Brooks' plain interpretation of the statute gives to the "and" by 
recognizing its plain, usual, and ordinary meaning-that "[t]he 
'conjunction 
with the 
words or 
"' See Ameritel Inns, Inc., 1 
. 1 n 
in the 
that the 
id. Thus, 
plain interpretation of the statute. 
is 
is SU 
is a 
inary 
of 
Additionally, the Opinion is inconsistent with Verska it modifies plain 
meaning of§ 49-808(2) based on the asserted purpose for enacting the legislation. The 
Opinion determines that "Brooks's interpretation would mean that a vehicle traveling at 
speeds of up to 80 mph-the newly increased speed limit on Idaho interstates-would 
need to signal for less than a second before changing lanes," which "would be 
inconsistent with the clearly expressed legislative intent of ensuring driver safety by 
requiring signals that are appropriate for the attendant circumstances." (Opinion, p.7.) 
However, this Court in Verska explained that "[t]he asserted purpose for enacting the 
legislation cannot modify its plain meaning." Verska, 151 Idaho at 892-93 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). "If the statute as written is socially or otherwise unsound, the 
17 
is 
have 
is 
Opinion 
of ensuring driver 
turning from a 
signal for not 
position on 
last 100 
) 
"impossibility," 
or would results 
mean 
in interpretation 
d 
it Id 
other than a 
traveled 
if 
Idaho 
plain 
authority" to "revise[] or void[] an unambiguous on the 
it 
it 
is patently absurd or would produce absurd results when construed as written." Verska, 
151 Idaho 896. Thus, the Opinion's revision of the statute in light of 
purpose for enacting the legislation is inconsistent with Verska. 
Also, Verska requires a court to construe a statute "as a whole." Id. In another 
recent case, the Idaho Supreme Court stated, "Provisions should not be read in 
isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the entire document." State v. 
Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866 (2011) (quoting Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 
307, 310 (2009)). In the context of the entire document here,§ 49-808(1) governs when 
a signal is required: "No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle 
18 
u or or h u until 
can nor 
signal." l.C. § 49-808(1 ). Thus, a turning from a parked on any 
other than a controlled-access highway would still be required to give an 
appropriate signal. 
In sum, the Opinion is inconsistent with precedent from the Idaho Supreme Court 
and the Court of Appeals' prior decisions. The Opinion does not give the word "and" its 
plain, usual, and ordinary conjunctive meaning. 151 Idaho Rather, 
the Opinion essentially revises the statute so that "and" means "or." Thus, this Court 
should review authority in case. 
On review, this Court should hold that l.C. § 49-808(2) is an unambiguous statute 
requiring a five-second signal only when a driver is both on a controlled-access highway 
and turning from a parked position. Because Mr. Brooks did not violate § 49-808(2), 
and Trooper Higley offered no other reason for initiating the traffic stop, the stop was not 
justified at its inception by reasonable suspicion unless the officer's mistake of law gave 
rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to uphold the stop. 
D. Because The Issue Was Not Litigated Below, This Case Should Be Remanded 
For The District Court To Determine Whether The Officer's Mistake Of Law Gave 
Rise To The Reasonable Suspicion Necessary To Uphold The Traffic Stop 
Mr. Brooks did not violate l.C. § 49-808(2), and the officer here therefore 
misapprehended the statute when he initiated the traffic stop. Trooper Higley's 
misapprehension of § 49-808(2) was a mistake of law. The United States Supreme 
Court recently held in Heien v. Not1h Carolina, 574 U.S._, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014), that 
a mistake of law can give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to uphold a search 
19 
uphold the was 
litigated below. 
Mr. su that the misapprehension of l.C. § 49-808(2) was 
solely a mistake of law. While the line between a mistake of fact and a mistake of law 
"is not always easy to draw," State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 303 (Ct. App. 2010), the 
officer's mistake here was one of law. The officer in State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119 
(Ct. App. 1999), "was mistaken about the fact of the speed limit sign's location and 
the law regarding the speed limit applicable." McCarthy, 133 Idaho 1 
(emphasis in original). In contrast, Trooper Higley was only mistaken about the law 
regarding the signaling requirements applicable to Mr. Brooks. Mr. Brooks 
acknowledged that was on a controlled-access highway, and there were no factual 
disputes about his location or his conduct while driving. (See R., p.88.) The mistake 
here was on the law generally regarding when a five-second signal must be made. 
Cf Horton, 150 Idaho at 304 ("His mistake was not the law generally regarding a 
repossession agent plate or its legal existence, but whether, in fact, the plate on this 
vehicle was a designated repossession plate. . . . [W]e conclude that the mistake at 
issue was primarily one of fact, not one of law."). Thus, the officer's misapprehension of 
the statute was solely a mistake of law. 
After the Idaho Court of Appeals issued the Opinion in this case, the United 
States Supreme Court held in Heien that a mistake of law can give rise to the 
reasonable suspicion necessary to uphold a search or seizure under the Fourth 
20 
U .. 1 in an 
on 
a court later determined that only one working brake light was required law. 
Id. 135 S. Ct. at The Heien Court held that, "Because officer's mistake 
about the brake-light law was reasonable, the in this case was lawful under the 
Fourth Amendment." Id. at 135 S. Ct. at 534. However, the Court also stated, 
"The Fourth Amendment tolerates only reasonable mistakes, and those mistakes-
whether of fact or of law-must be objectively reasonable." Id. at 135 S. Ct. at 539 
(emphasis in original). 
The of officer's of law, in light to 
the reasonable suspicion to uphold the traffic stop was not litigated 
The parties did not have the benefit of the Heien decision when the district court 
considered whether to grant Mr. Brooks' motion to suppress. The district court did not 
determine whether Trooper Higley's mistake of law in this case gave rise to the 
reasonable suspicion necessary to uphold the traffic stop, clarifying that its discussion of 
mistakes of law was "merely dictum." (See R., p.119.) The Court of Appeals did not 
reach the issue in the Opinion. (See Opinion, p.3). 
Further, whether Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution is more protective than 
the Fourth Amendment in this context was not addressed below. Mr. Brooks requested 
that the district court suppress the evidence based upon legal precedents including the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution. (R., pp.26-32.) This Court has held that, in some instances, Article I,§ 17 
provides greater protections to individuals than the parallel provision in the Fourth 
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1 Thus, if Article I, § 17 is more protective than Fourth Amend in this 
context, an officer's mistake of law may render a search or seizure per se unreasonable 
u the parties did not have the benefit of the 
Heien decision, whether Article I, § 17 is more protective than the Fourth Amendment in 
this context was not addressed below. 
The parties should be given the opportunity to fully litigate this mistake of law 
issue. Thus, on review, this Court should vacate the district court's order of probation 
on withheld judgment, reverse the district court's order denying the motion suppress, 
remand this case for the district court to determine whether the officer's mistake of 
law gave rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to uphold the stop. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Mr. Brooks respectfully requests that this Court grant 
review. On review, Mr. Brooks respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district 
court's order of probation on withheld judgment, reverse the district court's order 
denying the motion to suppress, and remand the case to the district court for 
further proceedings. 
DATED this 121h day of January, 2015. 
BEN P. MCGREEVY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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